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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1648 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOHN L. KNIGHT, 
 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 2:15-cr-00004-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Jose L. Linares 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 9, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: August 23, 2017) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________________
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 John L. Knight appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred in 
counting his prior robbery convictions as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the sentencing judgment.  
I 
 
 Knight was charged with being a felon in possession of a weapon in January 2015.  
His sentencing was based, in part, on the Probation Department’s determination that 
Knight’s prior convictions—including one for aggravated assault and two for first-degree 
robbery (which constituted a single count)—qualified as “crimes of violence” under 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).  Section 2K2.1 increases a defendant’s base offense level when 
the defendant has prior convictions that constitute “crime[s] of violence,” as defined in 
U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1).1     
Knight filed a motion in District Court pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 to correct 
his sentence. The District Court determined that Knight’s prior first-degree robbery 
convictions were, in fact, crimes of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1), but the aggravated 
assault conviction was not.2  The District Court ultimately sentenced Knight to 55 
                                              
1 Section 2K2.1 does not define “crime of violence” in its text; instead, its commentary 
says that “‘[c]rime of violence’ has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(a) and 
Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.”  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.1.  That 
commentary is “a binding interpretation of the phrase ‘crime of violence’” in § 2K2.1.  
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 47 (1993).  Accordingly, Section 2K2.1 
incorporates § 4B1.2(a) of the United State Sentencing Guidelines Manual and 
Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2, as if those provisions were expressly set forth in the text 
of § 2K2.1 itself.   
2 United States v. Knight, 2016 WL 223701 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2016).   
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months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release and imposed a $100 special 
assessment fee.  This appeal followed.3  
II. 
 
A. Background  
Knight challenges only the District Court’s determination that his prior New 
Jersey robbery convictions qualify as crimes of violence.4  The relevant New Jersey 
robbery statute reads:  
(a) Robbery Defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing 
a theft, he: 
 
1. Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or 
2. Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily 
injury; or 
3. Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or 
second degree.  
 
An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase “in the course of committing a 
theft” if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission. 
 
(b) Grading. Robbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it is a 
crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor 
attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious 
bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
deadly weapon.5 
 
                                              
3 The Government withdrew its cross-appeal.  Gov’t Br. 1.  
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Whether a prior 
conviction constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender Guideline is 
a question of law over which we exercise plenary review.”  United States v. Brown, 765 
F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2014). 
5 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1 (West 2017).  
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Knight’s prior robbery convictions included one under subsection (a)(1) and one under 
subsection (a)(2).6  Both were aggravated to first degree under subsection (b).   
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines define “crime of violence” as “any offense 
under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 
that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another.”7  We recently clarified in United States v. Chapman that 
“use of physical force” in that definition “does not require that the person employing 
force directly apply harm to—i.e., strike—the victim.”8  Instead, we held, “the ‘use’ of 
‘physical force,’ as used in § 4B1.2(a)(1), involves the intentional employment of 
something capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person, regardless of 
whether the perpetrator struck the victim’s body.”9     
Here, the District Court, observing that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1 was divisible, 
applied the “modified categorical approach”10 and concluded that first-degree robbery 
                                              
6 The District Court apparently considered only whether a violation of (a)(1) aggravated 
in the first degree qualified as a crime of violence.  See App. 25.  
7 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).  A prior felony conviction separately qualifies if it is for an 
offense expressly enumerated in § 4B1.2(a)(2) or Application Note 1. 
8 United States v. Chapman, --- F.3d ---, No. 16-1810, 2017 WL 3319287, at *3 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 4, 2017).   
9 Id.  
10 When a statute is divisible—i.e., when it “comprises multiple, alternative versions of 
the crime,” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013)—a sentencing court 
“may look to a limited class of extra-statutory documents to determine which version of 
the offense was the basis of conviction,” Brown, 765 F.3d at 191.  This is known as the 
modified categorical approach.  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).  Under 
that approach, the sentencing court is permitted to consult, for example, the “charging 
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual 
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always qualified as a crime of violence under New Jersey law.11  It also found that 
Knight’s Shepard documents demonstrated that he had, in fact, pled guilty to first-degree 
robbery (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(b)).12     
B. Analysis   
Although the District Court did not conclude as much, the Government argues that 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(b) is, itself, divisible.13  That is, each way of aggravating 
second-degree robbery into first-degree robbery under the New Jersey statute requires 
proof of an element not required for the other way of committing that crime.  
We agree with the Government.14  Accordingly, we may, under the modified 
categorical approach, consult available Shepard documents to determine whether Knight 
necessarily admitted elements to a crime that would qualify as a predicate crime-of-
                                                                                                                                                  
finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented”—those which have been 
referred to as Shepard documents.  Id.     
11 The District Court specifically found that “[r]egardless of which subsection an 
individual is convicted under (i.e., subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3)), if a conviction 
under N.J.S.A. § 2C:15-1 is in the first degree under subsection (b), it will always be a 
crime of violence.”  App. 26.  The District Court found particularly compelling the fact 
that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(b), based on its text, essentially had the “use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force” as an element if robbery was found in the first 
degree.  App. 26 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4Bl .2(a)(l)).  Id.   
12 Consulting the Model Penal Code, the District Court also determined that New Jersey’s 
first-degree robbery was not “overbroad” and that its elements “sufficiently correspond[] 
to first-degree robbery as commonly understood” such that it “qualifies as a predicate 
offense for sentencing purposes.”  App. 27–28.   
13 The District Court found only that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1, as a whole, was divisible.    
14 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(b) (West 2017) (“Robbery is a crime of the second 
degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft 
the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily 
injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.” 
(emphasis added)).  
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violence.15  The Shepard documents Knight provided for his New Jersey robbery 
convictions include his plea colloquy.  That clearly establishes that the aggravator he 
admitted for both first-degree robbery convictions was a threat to use a deadly weapon.   
Knight relies on United States v. Johnson,16 to now argue that his first-degree 
robbery convictions cannot qualify as crimes of violence because they were for offenses 
that do not require the kind of violent force that the Supreme Court requires.   In Johnson, 
the Supreme Court explained that “physical force” (as used to define a “violent felony” in 
the statute there) was “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person” 
and that the term, “violent,” itself, “connotes a substantial degree of force.”17  Knight 
then points to United States v. Jones,18 a case decided after Johnson.  There, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that a New York first-degree robbery 
statute did not qualify as a crime of violence.  
Knight maintains that the “mere threat of a deadly weapon—not its use, just its 
mention—categorically fails to require any force, much less violent physical force.”19   
He further concludes that the issue is “not whether [he] committed the robberies using 
                                              
15 See Chapman, 2017 WL 3319287, at *4.   
16 559 U.S. 133 (2010).  
17 Id. at 140.  Johnson involved a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), not the career offender Guideline, but it still 
instructs our analysis here.  “Precedent . . . requires the application of case law 
interpreting ‘violent felony’ in [the] ACCA to ‘crime of violence’ in [Guideline] 
§ 4B1.2[] because of the substantial similarity of the two sections.”  United States v. 
Marrero, 743 F.3d 389, 395 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) (first and fourth alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008)), abrogated on other 
grounds by United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2016).  
18 No. 15-1518, 2016 WL 3923838 (2d Cir. July 21, 2016).  
19 Appellant’s Br. 27. 
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physical force but whether the [New Jersey first-degree robbery] statute permits 
conviction without the use of physical force.”20  
We disagree. “[U]se” of “physical force” necessarily encompasses threatening the 
immediate use of a deadly weapon, which Knight admitted when he pled guilty.   In 
Chapman, we concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), which prohibits mailing “any threat to 
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another,” 
constituted a crime of violence under § 4B1.1(a) of the Guidelines.21  As we explained in 
Chapman, an argument like Knight’s “allows no room for murder or voluntary 
manslaughter to qualify as crimes of violence because both offenses can be committed 
without the perpetrator striking the victim.”22   
Although our analysis differs slightly from the District Court’s reasoning, we are 
convinced that purposely threatening another with what is perceived to be a deadly 
weapon is threatening the victim with “physical force,” as that phrase is defined in 
Johnson.23  Knight’s first-degree robbery convictions under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(b) 
                                              
20 Appellant’s Reply Br. 4.  
21 Chapman, 2017 WL 3319287, at *2.   
22 Id. at *6 (concluding that “[t]his would substantially undermine Congress’s goal of 
imposing substantial prison terms on repeat violent offenders” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)).    
 Jones concerned a different offense than Knight’s.  In addition, the Second Circuit 
vacated that opinion.  See United States v. Jones, 838 F.3d 296, 296 (2d Cir. 2016).  
23 See Singh v. Gonzalez, 432 F.3d 533, 539–41 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the 
perpetrator’s intent to threaten a victim with physical injury).  
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therefore qualify as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) and, by extension, 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a).24  
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Knight’s sentence.  
                                              
24 Given the basis for our conclusion, we need not reach the issue of whether Knight’s 
robbery convictions fall within the generic definition of robbery or whether it remains an 
enumerated offense under the Guidelines.  We further decline to rule whether N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:15-1(a)(1) and § 2C:15-1(a)(2) individually qualify as crimes of violence.  
